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a b s t r a c t
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a general class
of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games, without assuming a stationary setting. The only required
hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular,
no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-
varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), externalities, and other-regarding preferences. As a
side result, we clarify the meaning of assumptions on ‘‘continuity at infinity.’’
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Distributional conflicts stand at the core of economics. From
budget negotiations among institutional agents to collective or
individual wage agreements, from cost-sharing decisions for the
financing of public goods to asset liquidations and bankrupt-
cies, such conflicts give rise to rich strategic problems. Bargain-
ing models and procedures are rightly viewed as the main tool
for their study and resolution. A vast literature has addressed
this issue by applying techniques from both cooperative and
non-cooperative game theory, with the former providing im-
portant axiomatic characterizations of appealing solutions (e.g.
Nash, 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Thomson, 1981) and
the latter allowing for explicit procedural analyses taking into
account the timing of offers (e.g. Rubinstein, 1982; Shaked and
Sutton, 1984; Binmore, 1987).
A particularly important milestone was set by the canoni-
cal model of bilateral sequential bargaining (Stahl, 1972; Ru-
binstein, 1982), which can be viewed as a link between these
two approaches, showing that with small enough frictions the
equilibrium of the strategic game approximates the cooperative
Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). Accordingly, this model
has enjoyed widespread popularity and the insights arising from
bilateral strategic bargaining have been applied to models of
increasing generality, e.g. allowing for more than two bargaining
partners. The basic structure of such models specifies a procedure
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by which a player makes a proposal and the rest of the players
collectively decide whether to accept or reject it; in case of rejec-
tion another player gets to make a new proposal. Specific models
vary in many dimensions, ranging from the order of proposals
to the characteristics of individual utilities and the collective
acceptance rule, a particularly crucial element whenever there are
more than two players.
Even under perfect information, the existence of (subgame
perfect) equilibria has always been an issue in this literature.
This is because bargaining games are large games. On the one
hand, potential proposals are naturally from a continuum, e.g.
the division of a resource. On the other hand, in most non-
cooperative bargaining models the potential horizon is infinite, so
as to not impose artificial, exogenous constraints on the problem
(last-period effects). To make progress, the literature has typically
concentrated on stationary environments (where each bargaining
round is equivalent to previous ones in a well-defined sense,
except for the history of offers up to that point) and restricted at-
tention to stationary equilibria. In the recent decades, important
equilibrium existence results have been provided by Merlo and
Wilson (1995), Banks and Duggan (2000), Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2015). All those results,
however, focus on stationary environments and restrict to partic-
ular subclasses of games by, e.g., making explicit assumptions on
the set of feasible payoffs (e.g., convexity) or considering specific
collective acceptance rules (typically unanimity).
The assumption of stationarity is presumably appropriate for
bargaining in the souq, or for many business deals that are struck
in a stationary environment. There are also other bargaining pro-
cesses, though. Peace negotiations constitute a telling example.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102540
0304-4068/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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They get stalled for a while, then breakthroughs are achieved,
followed by periods of contemplation, then consensus is achieved
swiftly, followed again by stubborn insistence on details, and so
on. This is perhaps not surprising, as peace talks typically do not
take place in a stationary environment—after all, they tend to
happen during an ongoing war. Peace-time negotiations among
countries can also display similar phenomena and be affected by
changes of government and circumstances. For instance, the ‘‘six-
party talks’’ on North Korea’s nuclear program went on for six
years before they collapsed in 2009, and talks on the possibility of
resuming negotiations happened only after a leadership change in
North Korea and attempts by several different U.S. governments.
Sometimes, the environment appears to be reasonably stationary
but the outcome is anything but. Consider, for instance, negoti-
ations on trade liberalization. Those display a stunning amount
of non-stationarity—to the extent that they may fail entirely, as
witnessed in the Doha round of the WTO that was suspended
in 2016 after 14 years of talks (see New York Times, January 1,
2016, p. A22).1 Negotiation stalemates are not uncommon during
mergers and acquisitions, either. Political negotiations among
parties, e.g. for government formation, are another example, with
many real-life examples including lengthy negotiations and even
breakdowns. A recent case is the failure of a three-party coalition
to agree on a government agenda in Germany on November 2017,
after two months of negotiations (see New York Times, November
20, 2017, p. A9).2 All these instances point to the need for a
bargaining theory that does not rely exclusively on stationarity.
Indeed, bargaining theory would be incomplete without a general
existence result that allows for non-stationarities and more than
two partners, as addressed here and by a small but growing
literature (e.g. Li, 2007, 2011; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2018).
The objective of this paper is to present a general existence
theorem for multilateral sequential bargaining, encompassing a
large class of not necessarily stationary problems, and includ-
ing an algorithm allowing to actually identify subgame-perfect
equilibria. A secondary objective is to illustrate the application of
the recent general result of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b),
which was formulated in abstract topological terms for arbitrary
extensive form games. Since the framework extends beyond sta-
tionary environments, the analysis does not (and cannot) focus
on stationary strategies but rather considers the existence of
subgame perfect equilibrium in arbitrary pure strategies. The
main result allows for arbitrary acceptance rules, of course in-
cluding the most widespread rule found in the literature, namely
unanimity (e.g. Haller, 1986; Herrero, 1989), but also majority
voting (Eraslan and Merlo, 2002) and many other rules considered
in applications (Kalandrakis, 2004). Veto rights and dictatorial
arrangements are also allowed. Further, the acceptance rules need
not be constant over time. The order of proposals also allows for
many possibilities. A fixed cyclical order is a popular choice in
the received literature, but some natural alternatives are equally
plausible. Our result allows for any exogenous order (cyclical or
not), but also for endogenous procedures, for example, selecting
the first player who rejects the previous offer to become the next
proposer (Selten, 1981; Chatterjee et al., 1993; Ray and Vohra,
1999). Finally, differences and asymmetries in utility functions
are of course allowed, as they remain important elements af-
fecting equilibrium predictions. Those include but go far beyond
1 See also Bagwell et al. (2017) for a detailed theoretical and empirical
analysis of the Torquay Round (1950–51) of tariff bargaining.
2 Another example is given by the negotiations after the Spanish general
elections of December 2015, which failed to produce a stable coalition, leading
to new elections in June 2016. Those were followed by months of negotiations
among different parties, which again failed to produce a stable coalition, and
ended with the establishment of a minority government in October 2016 (see
New York Times, October 30, 2016, p. A12).
differences in discount factors, for the only constraint which will
be imposed on utilities is continuity, as we will discuss below.
Hence, the bargaining problems studied here need not have any
stationary structure other than the fact that the bargaining part-
ners remain the same in all rounds. And even that requirement
can be relaxed, since time-dependent acceptance rules allow to
declare certain players ‘‘dummies’’ in given periods.
The existence result hence applies to a large class of games. It
also guarantees existence of equilibria in pure strategies. Further,
and in sharp contrast with the literature, it relies on one and
only one elementary assumption: continuity of payoffs on the
set of feasible economic outcomes, i.e. on actual allocations. In
particular, and in contrast to previous existence results, no direct
assumptions are imposed on the sets of payoffs, and likewise
no direct assumptions on the mapping from strategy profiles
to bargaining outcomes are made. The result’s hypotheses are
hence stated on the actual primitives of the model (outcomes
and payoff functions). This is important, because continuity of the
payoff functions is often straightforward in applications, and it is
easier to verify than properties of the space of feasible payoffs.
For instance, our result applies directly to other-regarding prefer-
ences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and
can be extended to cover utility functions capturing hyperbolic
or quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Strotz, 1956; Laibson, 1997).
Moreover, the continuity assumption is an elementary one.
Topologically, we take advantage of the fact that the space of
instantaneous allocations (vectors of shares) is compact in the
Euclidean topology and construct appropriate topologies on the
space of economic outcomes based on the Euclidean one. Specifi-
cally, what is assumed is that, for each fixed period t , payoff func-
tions are continuous (in the Euclidean sense) with respect to the
shares allocated to agents. Additionally, it is assumed that payoffs
are ‘‘continuous at infinity’’, in the sense that payoff differences
which accrue sufficiently far in the future become negligible in
comparison to present payoff differences. This property parallels
the assumption in, e.g., Rubinstein (1982, Assumption A4) and
amounts to the notion of continuity at infinity introduced by Fu-
denberg and Levine (1983). In those works, however, continuity
at infinity was stated as an additional condition, without an
explicitly topological foundation. As a byproduct of our analysis
(and a fact of independent interest), however, we prove that con-
tinuity at infinity is not an additional condition. Rather, we show
that payoff functions are continuous with respect to the natu-
ral topologies on the space of bargaining outcomes (allocations
and times at which they obtain) if and only if both conditions
mentioned above hold.
It is also worth emphasizing that the existence result, whose
proof makes use of the recent abstract result of Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2016b) (see also Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016a,
2017a,b), comes with an algorithm which allows to actually iden-
tify subgame perfect equilibria for a given model, and which we
will illustrate in the examples.
Finally, one should remark that a limitation of the approach
presented here is that it is restricted to games without chance
moves. The latter can be important for bargaining models, es-
pecially if they reflect unstructured bargaining where the order
of proposals is unclear. Indeed, the literature (see Section 2)
has studied several bargaining protocols including chance moves.
Those remain beyond the domain of the present paper. The rea-
son is that general existence results for infinite-horizon games,
as the existence result invoked here (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger,
2016b), also do not allow for chance moves. Random ordering
of proposers and responders, even in perfect information games,
may lead to a failure of equilibrium existence. For instance, Britz
et al. (2015) show that with a stochastic selection of proposers
and a random order of responders under unanimity, stationary
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subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies may not exist. This
is an instance of the general observation by Luttmer and Mariotti
(2003): even with perfect information and a finite horizon equi-
librium existence may fail, if chance moves destroy continuity of
payoff functions. Hence, the work presented here concentrates on
deterministic settings.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a brief
literature overview. Section 3 specifies the class of bargaining
models to be studied. Section 4 states the main existence re-
sult and provides an intuitive explanation of its proof. Section 5
gives illustrations and discusses a few extensions of the result.
Section 6 concludes. The formal proof of the theorem and the nec-
essary topological constructions are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Related literature
2.1. Noncooperative bargaining
It would be an impossible task to review the extensive lit-
erature on bargaining models, even if one were to restrict to
noncooperative models. This section merely attempts to provide
a few pointers to key and recent developments in the area, to
better put the main result in perspective.
The starting point of the literature is of course the model
of sequential bilateral bargaining (Stahl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982;
Shaked and Sutton, 1984; Binmore, 1987). Models of multilateral
(n ≥ 3) bargaining were quick to follow, starting with Haller
(1986) and Herrero (1989). Those authors studied multilateral
bargaining games with a unanimity rule and found multiplicity
of subgame perfect equilibria if either the bargaining partners
are sufficiently patient or voting is simultaneous. At the same
time, the link between cooperative and non-cooperative models
remained a focal point. For instance, Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)
presented a non-cooperative bargaining game applied to a coali-
tional game that yields the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining
solution in special cases. Following on both developments, Kr-
ishna and Serrano (1996) recursively extended the bilateral bar-
gaining model to a multilateral problem and established links to
cooperative solutions.
Most general existence results for infinite-horizon multilateral
bargaining have concentrated on subgame perfect equilibria in
stationary strategies and the particular case of unanimity rules.
Further, such results usually require additional, explicit assump-
tions on the set of feasible payoffs. For instance, the seminal
works of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Banks and Duggan (2000)
for the unanimity rule establish existence of (pure-strategy) sta-
tionary equilibria when the set of feasible payoffs is compact,
convex, and comprehensive from below. More recently Kultti and
Vartiainen (2010) demonstrate that when the utility possibility
set is compact, convex, and strictly comprehensive and the Pareto
frontier is differentiable, all stationary subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcomes converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the
delay between proposals vanishes.
Further results along these lines have been recently obtained
by Britz et al. (2010, 2014, 2015) and Herings and Predtetchinski
(2015, 2016). Britz et al. (2010) study the convergence of sta-
tionary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs as the cost of delay
becomes negligible for multilateral sequential bargaining with
action-independent proposers. Britz et al. (2014) provide an equi-
librium existence result for stationary strategies under unanim-
ity with action-dependent proposers. Herings and Predtetchinski
(2015) show existence of stationary equilibria when feasible pay-
offs form a set that is closed and comprehensive from below and
utility functions are bounded, also for the unanimity rule. Herings
and Predtetchinski (2016) establish existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium for unanimity bargaining in stationary strategies
under monotonicity constraints.
Our work concentrates on bargaining games without chance
moves. As mentioned in the introduction, Britz et al. (2015) show
that stationary subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies may
fail to exist in bargaining games with a unanimity rule where both
proposers and the order of responders are determined randomly.
Some positive results, however, have been obtained for particular
bargaining models with stochastic elements. For instance, exis-
tence is preserved in some bargaining models with random order-
ing of proposers and responders, as in Britz et al. (2010). Eraslan
(2002) considers multilateral sequential bargaining when players
differ with respect to their probability to become proposer and
their discount factors, and characterizes the set of stationary sub-
game perfect equilibria. Eraslan and Merlo (2002) allow majority
voting and that the surplus evolves stochastically; they find mul-
tiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, which
may not be efficient. Eraslan and McLennan (2013) consider a
random-proposer model with acceptance determined by winning
coalitions associated with the proposer and use index theory to
demonstrate uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs.
Extensions of the basic multilateral bargaining model have
allowed for different (but typically fixed) agreement rules, as ma-
jority voting (Eraslan and Merlo, 2002). Kalandrakis (2004, 2006)
established existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria
for more general agreement rules. Duggan (2017) establishes
existence of stationary equilibria for a class of dynamic games
that includes many bargaining models. This development has also
extended to the relation with the cooperative approach. For in-
stance, Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) characterize an extension
of Nash’s bargaining solution for voting rules beyond unanimity.
In the existence result presented below, all conceivable agree-
ment rules are allowed, and additionally there is no requirement
that the agreement rule should remain fixed over time.
Among the many additional extensions of the basic bargaining
setting that have been explored in the literature, one should men-
tion multi-issue bargaining. Assuming a unanimity rule, sequen-
tial bargaining about several issues has been studied by Inderst
(2000), Busch and Horstmann (2002), and In and Serrano (2003,
2004). This extension can also be encompassed in our setting (see
Section 5).
2.2. Equilibrium existence in infinite games
Our existence result builds upon the existence theorem
by Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b, Theorem 1; 2016a, The-
orem 7.4). This is an abstract result establishing existence of
subgame perfect equilibria for arbitrarily large perfect informa-
tion games, provided the space W of plays (outcomes) can be
endowed with some compact and separated (Hausdorff) topology
such that the payoff functions defined on the space of plays are
continuous with respect to that topology. We remark that, when
the separation axiom (Hausdorff) is strengthened to perfectly
normal, Theorem 1 of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b) be-
comes a characterization (see Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2017b).
Therefore, in this sense it is as general as any (topological)
existence theorem for perfect information games can become.
A previous existence theorem for large perfect information
games is due to Harris (1985). The difference between the result
of Harris (1985) and the theorem of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger
(2016b), which we employ here, is that the former constructs a
particular (product) topology on W , while the latter allows for
an arbitrary topology on W . Specifically, Harris (1985) starts out
with individual topologies for the action spaces corresponding
to each individual decision in the game. Assuming those to be
compact, the product topology is also compact. However, that
space is typically much larger than the actual space of plays
(seen as chains of choices in the game), and hence Harris (1985)
3
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requires the additional assumption that the latter subspace is a
closed subset of the product space. In contrast, Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2016b) works directly with the space of plays. In
this sense, the existence theorem of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger
(2016b) encompasses and supersedes the one of Harris (1985).
Further, the result of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b) covers
many games and topologies not covered by previous existence
theorems as Harris (1985) (for a discussion, see Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger, 2016b, Example 7 and Section 5). For instance, The-
orem 1 of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b) allows for topolo-
gies not derived from a Tychonoff product construction, a point
also illustrated in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2017a, Example 2)
(see also Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016a, Examples 1.2, p. 12,
7.3, p. 166, 7.4, p. 168, and 7.17, p. 209).
This difference, however, is less important for the application
at hand, because infinite-horizon bargaining games naturally lend
themselves to the use of exactly such a product construction.
For this reason, the proof of Theorem 1 could also be based on
the existence theorem of Harris (1985). The proof’s complexity
would remain the same, though. For example, one would need
to prove directly that the space of plays is a closed subset of the
product action space. Relying on Theorem 1 of Alós-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2016b), however, opens the door to generalizations
where payoff functions are continuous with respect to arbitrary
topologies on plays (see, e.g., Section 5.5). Further, that result pro-
vides an explicit algorithm for identifying pure-strategy subgame
perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games, which is different
from standard arguments relying on truncated games and which
will be illustrated in Section 5.1.
3. A general model for multi-lateral bargaining
The class of models studied here encompasses a wide variety
of multi-lateral bargaining games, the bilateral case being nested.
Their common feature is that offers are made by some proposer,
who may be different each round, and then there is a sequential
procedure for the decision on whether or not the proposal is
implemented. As discussed above, the bargaining literature has
often focused on a unanimity rule for the latter. Although this
important case is of course covered, the framework presented
here allows for many other procedures as well. For example,
implementation could be decided by majority voting with simple
or qualified majority, a veto mechanism where some or all part-
ners may be able to block the proposal, or simply a dictatorial
rule where a designated person has to agree. Furthermore, the
decision procedure may change from one round to the next, as
may the identity of the proposer. For instance, the first round may
require unanimity for the implementation of the proposal, the
second a 90-percent majority, the third an 80-percent majority,
and so on until at some point the consent of one participant
suffices for implementation. Of course, the bar could also move
in the other direction, requiring a higher and higher majority as
proposals get rejected. Finally, the decision procedure can depend
on the result of the previous bargaining round: for instance, next
round’s proposer might be the first player to reject the previous
proposal.
Formally, a bargaining game is a quadruple (I, ρ, ψ, u) consist-












and a vector of utility functions u = (ui)i∈I . These objects will
now be explained in detail.
Bargaining takes place over potentially infinitely many rounds
indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . Each round t begins with a proposal















ai = 1, ai ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
}
which specifies the intended shares of the current surplus for all
players, where w.l.o.g. the surplus is normalized to 1. (In fact, all
arguments would go through if the simplex ∆ were replaced by a
nonempty and compact subset of some Euclidean space.) All par-
ticipants learn this proposal and then get to express their opin-
ions or cast their votes sequentially. Votes take a 0–1 form, with
1 meaning acceptance and 0 indicating rejection. At every round
t the votes cast by players moving from the second to the nth
position form a voting profile bt = (bt2, . . . , b
t
n) ∈ B = {0, 1}
n−1
where, for notational convenience, the subscript indicates the
order of play in that round and not the player’s name.
Whether or not a proposal at ∈ ∆ is actually implemented
at (the end of) round t is determined by an aggregation function
ψ t : B → {0, 1}. That is, given a voting profile bt at stage t , the









0. The only assumption on ψ t is that ψ t (0, . . . , 0) = 0 and
ψ t (1, . . . , 1) = 1, that is, unanimous decisions are implemented.3
No other assumption is made.
Example 1. The unanimity rule is given by ψ t (b) = 0 for all
b ̸= (1, . . . , 1). A strict majority rule would be given by ψ t (b) = 1
if and only if
∑n
i=2 bi > (n − 1)/2. A q-majority rule, q ∈ [1/(n −
1), 1], would specify ψ t (b) = 1 if and only if
∑n
i=2 bi ≥ q(n − 1).
One could for instance specify that ψ t is an f (t)-majority rule,
with f : {1, 2, . . .} → [1/n, 1] a strictly decreasing function of
t . In such an example, the acceptance threshold for a decision
would be lowered gradually over time, perhaps in an attempt to
ensure a timely decision.
If round t ’s proposal is rejected, the game continues to round
t+1. Once a proposal is accepted, the game ends. Potentially, the
game can run forever (if proposals are always rejected).
The order of votes and the identity of the proposer at round
t are determined by a bargaining protocol as follows. For each
t = 1, 2, . . . and each j = 1, . . . , n, let r tj : B
t−1 → I determine
the order of play at t . That is, given the history of previous votes
b̄ ∈ Bt−1, r t1(b̄) ∈ I is the player acting as the proposer at t , hence
choosing at , while players r t2(b̄) to r
t
n(b̄) are moving second to last,
hence casting votes bt2 to b
t
n, respectively. For instance, r
t
1(b̄) = i
means that player i ∈ I gets to make a proposal, and r t3(b̄) = j
that player j ∈ I is the second to cast her vote. The bargaining





, where r t = (r t1, . . . , r
t
n) is such
that {r tj (b̄)}
n
j=1 = I for all b̄ ∈ B
t−1 and all t . The dependence
of r t on Bt−1 allows to encompass protocols where the order of
play depends on previous voting decisions (but not on the current
proposal), as Example 3 illustrates. However, if in a particular
example r t is independent of the order of play and the votes in
the previous periods, we will simply write r tj rather than r
t
j (·).
Example 2. If n = 2, the well-known bilateral bargaining game
with alternating proposers (Rubinstein, 1982; Shaked and Sutton,
1984; Binmore, 1987) is obtained by setting r t1 = 1 for all odd t ,
r t1 = 2 for all even t , and ψ
t (1) = 1 and ψ t (0) = 0 for all t .
For n > 2, a multi-lateral bargaining protocol with alternating
proposers can be specified setting r t1 = t mod n. This could be
combined with e.g. a unanimity rule or a simple majority rule as
above to obtain standard examples.
Histories of play will just contain the previous offers at and
previous voting decisions bt . Note that there is no need to record
the actual order of play within a given period t , since the bargain-
ing protocol, which is part of the description of the game, allows
to reconstruct that order from the previous voting decisions. The
3 This assumption is natural, but strictly speaking not needed. It would be
enough to assume that ψ t is not constant.
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following example takes advantage of this fact to encompass an
action-dependent voting order where the first player to reject the
previous offer becomes the next proposer. The example makes
transparent why the bargaining protocol needs to depend on all
previous rounds, because the name of ‘‘the first player to reject’’
at t depends on the order of votes at t , which in turn depends on
the order at t − 1.
Example 3. Let r1j = j for all j = 1, . . . , n (which just means
that players are named according to their order of play in the
initial period). For each t ≥ 1 and each (b1, . . . , bt ) ∈ Bt with
ψ t (bt ) = 0, let
r t+11 (b
1, . . . , bt ) = min
{
r tj (b
1, . . . , bt−1)
⏐




1, . . . , bt ) =
{
j − 1 if j ≤ r t+11 (b
1, . . . , bt )
j if j > r t+11 (b
1, . . . , bt )
for all j = 2, . . . , n. For (b1, . . . , bt ) ∈ Bt with ψ t (bt ) = 1,
arbitrarily (and inconsequentially) fix r t (b1, . . . , bt ) = r1. This
procedure assigns as proposer the first player to vote against the
proposal in the previous period, and lets all other players vote in
the fixed order derived from {1, . . . , n}.
The bargaining protocol is deterministic. As explained before,
a stochastic dependence on previous votes may interfere with
continuity of payoffs (Luttmer and Mariotti, 2003), hence our
existence result does not apply to that case (see also Britz et al.,
2015). A similar comment applies to simultaneous moves.
These specifications define a perfect information game among
the n bargaining partners. A play in this game is a complete
sequence of offers and voting profiles, from the beginning to
eventual acceptance, including sequences of infinite length where



























= 0 ∀t < T
}














The specifications above suffice to define the tree of this
extensive form (see, e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016a). In
particular, the nodes in the tree are those sets of plays that share
a fixed initial segment (formal definitions are provided in the
Appendix). Due to perfect information the players’ choices are the
(immediate) successor nodes of their decision points. That is, a
player active at a node simply chooses among successor nodes,
which represent the possible options (proposals or votes).
In general the set W of plays is the appropriate domain for
the players’ preferences. Yet, in the main part of the paper we
take a ‘‘non-procedural’’ stance by assuming that players care
only about the ultimate distribution of the surplus and about
when agreement was reached—not about how. (See Section 5
for extensions to a ‘‘procedural’’ approach.) In particular, it is
assumed that the players’ utility functions are defined on the set
Z = (∆× {1, 2, . . .}) ∪ {∞}
of outcomes. A pair (a, t) ∈ ∆ × {1, 2, . . .} amounts to an
agreement on the distribution a ∈ ∆ at round t = 1, 2, . . .; the
outcome ∞ corresponds to perpetual rejections. Accordingly, the
players’ preferences are represented by utility functions (or payoff
functions) ui : Z → R for all i ∈ I . The only assumption on
those will be continuity. In particular, utility functions need not
be monotonic. Further, no assumption on convexity of the set of
feasible payoffs is needed (in contrast to Merlo and Wilson, 1995;
Banks and Duggan, 2000; Britz et al., 2014).
4. A general existence result
The main hypothesis for the existence theorem in this paper
will be continuity of the utility functions. But clarifying what
this ought to mean is non-trivial, because continuity only makes
sense with respect to a topology. Within an infinite-horizon game
(and, actually, within any extensive form game), preferences are
defined on full histories of choices along the game, that is, on the
space of plays W . Hence, utility functions are a priori defined on a
very large, infinite-dimensional space, and continuity, as required
by abstract existence theorems, ultimately refers to a topology on
that space.
Within a bargaining game, however, it is natural to restrict
attention to the smaller set of outcomes Z , defined above. This
poses the problem that continuity of utility functions with respect
to Z is disentangled from the relevant topological continuity,
that is, continuity of the function assigning payoffs to plays.
One key result in our analysis (Proposition B.1 in the Appendix),
however, is that for a natural topology on W , continuity of the
mapping assigning payoffs to plays can be fully characterized by
two properties of the utility functions ui : Z → R. That is,
in the current setting, continuity of utilities on Z has two parts
(as in Rubinstein, 1982, Assumption A4). This is captured by the
following definition.
Definition 1. In a bargaining game, the payoff function ui : Z → R
of a player i is said to be continuous if
(i) for each t = 1, 2, . . . , the function uti : ∆ → R given by
uti (a) = ui(a, t) for each a ∈ ∆ is continuous (with respect
to the Euclidean topologies on ∆ and R), and
(ii) for each ε > 0 there exists T ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that for all
a ∈ ∆ and all t ≥ T , |ui(a, t) − ui(∞)| < ε.
Part (i) is simply continuity on ∆ (with respect to the topology
induced by the Euclidean metric). That is, for all t = 1, 2, . . . and




 < δ implies
⏐
⏐ui(a, t) − ui(a
′, t)
⏐
⏐ < ε. Part (ii) is ‘‘continuity at infinity’’ (Fu-
denberg and Levine, 1983), which is called for because of the
possibility of perpetual disagreement. Intuitively, the second part
says that sufficiently late agreements will make almost no differ-
ence. It is worth emphasizing that, because of the characterization
result just mentioned, continuity at infinity is not an additional
assumption here, but rather an integral part of continuity with
respect to the appropriate topology on plays. This fact extends
beyond the bargaining case and clarifies the role of continuity at
infinity for infinite-horizon games.
Remark 1. The present definition of continuity at infinity may
appear slightly different from the one proposed by Fudenberg
and Levine (1983). They required that for every ε > 0 there is
T such that whenever two (pure) strategy profiles agree up to T ,
then the two strategy profiles yield payoffs within ε from each
other. In particular, in their framework there was no outcome
of eternal continuation corresponding to ∞ ∈ Z . With such an
outcome ∞ the two definitions in fact agree. For, given ε > 0
consider a strategy profile that rejects all proposals up to the T
associated with ε by the Fudenberg–Levine criterion. Then there
is a second strategy profile that is identical to the first up to
T but thereafter always rejects, hence, yields the outcome ∞.
If (a, t) ∈ Z denotes the outcome induced by the first strategy
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profile, then |ui(a, t) − ui(∞)| < ε, as required. Conversely, given
ε/2 > 0 consider two strategy profiles that reject all proposals
up to the T associated with ε/2 by the present criterion. Then
the payoffs to the two strategy profiles must both be within ε/2
from ui(∞). By the triangle inequality it follows that the payoffs
to the two strategy profiles must be within ε from each other.
Hence, the two definitions coincide.
Impatience, as implied e.g. by geometric discounting and
bounded utility functions, is a sufficient condition for continuity
at infinity. The reason is that discounting will drive all payoffs
to zero as time goes on, which must then also be the utility
from perpetual disagreement. But impatience is a strictly stronger
condition than continuity at infinity. The following example il-
lustrates this point, that without continuity at infinity subgame
perfect equilibria may not exist—and that the present set-up
covers highly non-stationary cases.
Example 4. Rumor has it that some committees are kept busy
negotiating for the sole purpose of avoiding to be dissolved, even
though nobody wishes to negotiate forever. This can be expressed
by specifying ui(a, t) = 1 − δ
t−1 for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and all
t = 1, 2, . . . , and ui(∞) = 0 for all i ∈ I . These utility functions
fail continuity at infinity. Let n = 2, alternating offers as given by
r t1 = t mod 2, and ψ
t (0) = 0 and ψ t (1) = 1. This game has no
subgame perfect equilibrium (defined below). For, suppose that
there is an equilibrium that ends with agreement in round t . Then
the responder r t2 can do better by rejecting now and accepting
two rounds later. If there were an equilibrium with perpetual
disagreement, then at every finite t the responder r t2 could do
better by accepting immediately. If instead ui(∞) were set to
1 for all i ∈ I , restoring continuity at infinity and existence of
equilibrium, the committee would negotiate forever.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that in-
duces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Since bargaining
games have perfect information, a new subgame begins at every
move (non-terminal node) of the tree. The following is the main
result of the present paper.
Theorem 1. Every bargaining game with continuous payoff func-
tions has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Due to the generality of the class of games studied here the
details of the proof of this theorem are somewhat involved and
therefore relegated to the Appendix. Still, the next section pro-
vides an intuitive tour of the main ideas. (Readers who are not
interested in the construction may skip it.)
4.1. Structure of the proof
The proof consists of four steps. The first, and most laborious,
is to endow the set Z of outcomes and the set W of plays with
compact separated (Hausdorff) topologies in such a way that the
mapping from plays to outcomes is a continuous function ϕ :
W → Z . The purpose is to turn the utility functions ui : Z → R
that are defined on Z into continuous functions ui ◦ ϕ : W → R,
now defined on plays.
Based on first principles the space of outcomes is the union
Z = (∆× {1, 2, . . .}) ∪ {∞}. However, topologies derived from
unions are notorious for being badly behaved, and hence we con-
sider an alternative approach. The topology on Z is derived from
considering the auxiliary set ∆ × {1, 2, . . . ,∞}. The simplex ∆
carries the natural relative Euclidean topology. The extended nat-
ural numbers {1, 2, . . . ,∞} are equipped with the standard one-
point compactification topology. This is the topology for which
the open sets are those whose complements are either finite
or contain the point ∞ (equivalently, a subset is closed if it
is either finite or contains ∞). The topology on the product
∆ × {1, 2, . . . ,∞} is then the product topology (the coarsest
topology that makes both projections continuous). To obtain a
topology on Z , all elements of ∆ × {1, 2, . . . ,∞} with second
coordinate ∞ are identified to a single equivalence class. The
resulting quotient set Z̃ is endowed with the quotient topology,
the coarsest topology that makes the projection π continuous
(where π is defined by π ((a, t)) = (a, t) if t ̸= ∞ and
π ((a, t)) = [∞] otherwise). The end result corresponds to a one-
point compactification of the space ∆ × {1, 2, . . .}. Since Z̃ and
the original set Z of outcomes can be identified, this induces a
topology on Z . And this topology can be shown to be compact and
separated. (Compactness of Z̃ , hence Z , is directly inherited from
compactness of ∆ × {1, 2, . . . ,∞}; to show that it is separated
takes some work.)
To endow the set W of plays with a topology, this is first
embedded into the larger space
Ω∞ = [(∆ ∪ {∗})× (B ∪ {∗∗})]∞
of infinite sequences, where ∗ and ∗∗ denote dummy options,
representing that the game has already ended. Again, ∆ carries
the relative Euclidean topology, which remains compact and sep-
arated if the single, discretely separated point ∗ is appended.
The finite set B ∪ {∗∗} is endowed with the discrete topology
and is trivially compact and separated. By Tychonoff’s theorem
the infinite product Ω∞ is also compact (and Hausdorff is easily
established). Yet, this set is too big. Plays correspond only to
infinite sequences in the subset W̄ ⊆ Ω∞ where once an offer
is accepted, play actually ends. The set W̄ is characterized by the
following three conditions.
(S.1) ã1 ∈ ∆,









= 0∀s = 1, . . . , t − 1, for all
t = 1, 2, . . .
That is, (S.1), they begin with offers; (S.2), dummy options occur
always in both coordinates if at all; and, (S.3), a new bargaining
round starts if and only if all previous proposals have been
rejected. Call sequences in W̄ bargaining sequences.
The relevant set, hence, is the set W̄ of bargaining sequences.
The proof establishes that this set is closed in the set Ω∞ of all
sequences, which in turn implies that it is compact in the relative
topology. This topology then defines the appropriate topology,
because the set of plays can be fully identified with W̄ as follows.
Consider the map Λ : W → W̄ defined by
Λ(w) =
(







∈ W T , T ̸= ∞, and Λ(w) = w if w ∈
W∞. Showing that Λ is bijective establishes that the set W̄ of
bargaining sequences and the set W of plays are isomorphic.
Hence, the relative topology on W̄ can be used as the compact
and separated topology on W .
Once W and Z are endowed with compact separated topolo-
gies as described, one can turn to the map assigning outcomes










∈ W T , T ̸= ∞, and ϕ (w) = ∞ otherwise.
The first step of the proof is completed by showing that ϕ is
continuous, resulting in continuous payoff functions ui ◦ ϕ on a
compact separated space of plays.
With this preparation in place, it is now possible to invoke the
general existence theorem by Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b,
Theorem 1; 2016a, Theorem 7.4). This result guarantees exis-
tence of subgame perfect equilibria for arbitrarily large perfect
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information games, provided the space of plays is compact and
separated and the payoff functions defined on the space of plays
are continuous with respect to the topology on plays.
The existence theorem requires three additional hypotheses,
and hence the three remaining steps amount to checking them.
The second step establishes that the perfect information game is
well-behaved. This means showing that the set of non-terminal
nodes at a given ‘‘distance’’ from the root is partitioned into
finitely many cells, each of which consists of decision points of
a single player, whose unions are closed in the topology on plays.
This is essentially straightforward in the current setting, because
at the voting stages only finitely many players move. The only
point that requires some work occurs when a proposal is made,
because there are terminal nodes at the same distance from the
root as the proposers’ nodes.
The third step verifies that all nodes of the tree are closed as
sets of plays, which intuitively is necessary for the players’ opti-
mization problems to be well-defined. The fourth step, finally, es-
tablishes that the assignment of immediate predecessors of nodes
in the tree constitutes an open map, i.e. takes open sets to open
sets. This is equivalent to the assignment of immediate successors
being lower hemi-continuous, and essentially allows to ‘‘paste’’
the solutions of individual optimization problems together.
Once these four preparations are in place, all hypotheses of
the existence theorem by Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b, The-
orem 1; 2016a, Theorem 7.4) are verified and the existence of a
subgame perfect equilibrium follows.
5. Extensions and illustrations
This section illustrates the algorithm which underlies the
proof of Theorem 1 and offers a few possible extensions of the
main result.
5.1. The algorithm
The proof of Theorem 1 invokes the abstract existence the-
orem by Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b, Theorem 1; 2016a,
Theorem 7.4). The proof of the latter is based on an algorithm
that iterates the players’ expectations about what later players
will do until, in the limit, expectations are correct and behavior
is optimal with respect to these expectations.
The algorithm works as follows. Players start naïvely, that is,
when they decide, they pick a play as if they had full control of
all other players moving afterwards. This is the first step. In the
second step players develop some anticipation and now reopti-
mize under the constraints generated by what later players have
done in the first step. Hence, they become ‘‘smarter’’ and foresee
the choices (from the first step) of later players. This is repeated
in the third step. Players now reoptimize under the constraints
generated by the choices of later players from the second step,
and so on. This iteration has a limit, which is a set, though. The
existence theorem mentioned above shows that from this set
strategy profiles can be selected which in turn form subgame
perfect equilibria. If there is a unique equilibrium, the limit set
is a singleton and the algorithm delivers the equilibrium directly.
This can be nicely illustrated by bargaining games with a unique
equilibrium, e.g., by the classical bilateral alternating-proposer
model of Rubinstein (1982).
Example 5. More concretely, let n = 2, r t1 = t mod 2, r
t
2 =
3 − r t1, and ψ
t (0) = 0, ψ t (1) = 1, for all t = 1, 2, . . . , that
is, players take turns in making offers and the game ends once
the responder has accepted. For simplicity let payoffs be given by
ui(a, T ) = δ
T−1ai for some common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), for
all a ∈ ∆ and all T = 1, 2, . . . , and by ui(∞) = 0, for all i ∈ I .
Discounting is from one bargaining round to the next.
Obviously, Theorem 1 covers this basic example, which we use
now to illustrate the algorithm. The first step works as follows.
All proposers ask everything for themselves, c1 = 1, on the
assumption that they can force the responders to accept. All
responders who are offered more than δ will accept, because they
earn more than by rejecting and asking everything for themselves
next round. All responders who are offered less than δ will reject,
on account of making an accepted counteroffer next period that
allocates the whole surplus to them. Therefore, the ‘‘critical offer’’
(from the proposer’s viewpoint) for the second step is c2 =
1 − δ. This is critical because it is the only one at which the
responder may choose both Yes (1) and No (0). Since all offers
give 1 to the proposer and 0 to the responder, by δ < 1 all offers
effectively lead to perpetual rejections under first-step behavior
and to payoffs ui(∞) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Now turn to the second step. Since under first-step behavior
all offers that allocate less than δ to the responder are rejected
forever, in the second step all proposers offer δ to the responder
and demand c2 = 1 − δ for themselves. Hence, a responder, in a
subgame after a proposal that allocates less than δ to her, cannot
count on rejecting and asking 1 for herself next round, but must
take into account that she can at best get 1 − δ as next round’s
proposer, which is now worth δ(1− δ) to her. Therefore, she will
now accept any offer that leaves the proposer with no more than
1 − δ(1 − δ) = 1 − δ + δ2. The critical offer for the third step is
consequently c3 = 1 − δ + δ
2. At this proposal the responder is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting.
More generally, denote the critical offer from the τ th step for
the (τ + 1)th step by cτ . That is, any offer that allocates more
than cτ to the proposer (less than 1 − cτ to the responder) leads
to perpetual rejections, and any offer that allocates less than cτ
to the proposer (more than 1 − cτ to the responder) is accepted
under τ th step behavior; only at cτ both acceptance and rejection
are possible. Then in the (τ + 1)th step all proposals will allocate
cτ to the proposer and 1 − cτ to the responder. But a responder
who is confronted with an offer that gives her less than 1 − cτ
anticipates that by rejecting she will only be able to ask cτ for
herself next round, which is now worth δcτ to her. (If the offer
still gives her more than δcτ , she will now accept.) Therefore, the
critical offer at the (τ + 1)th step is cτ+1 = 1 − δcτ . This is a
















and this must be the offer made by all proposers in any sub-
game perfect equilibrium; in particular, such an equilibrium is
necessarily unique.
5.2. Hyperbolic discounting and multiple selves
Simple textbook examples of bargaining games often use ge-
ometric discounting (and ui(∞) = 0) to ensure continuity at
infinity. Theorem 1 makes no such assumptions. In fact, it is even
consistent with time-inconsistent choices as those arising from
‘‘hyperbolic’’ discounting (Strotz, 1956) where decision makers
today discount the step from today to tomorrow more than
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the step from tomorrow to the day after tomorrow.4 Consider,
for instance, the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson,
1997), which captures this effect through the sequence of dis-
count factors 1, βδ, βδ2, βδ3, . . . for β, δ ∈ (0, 1). The only
subtlety that arises for such ‘‘time-inconsistent’’ preferences is
that players have to be split into agents—a different agent for
each bargaining round. This is because players have different
preferences in each consecutive bargaining round. More gener-
ally, dynamically inconsistent preferences are often analyzed by
splitting an agent into a sequence of temporal selves making
choices in a dynamic game; this has given rise to the literature
on ‘‘multiple selves’’ (see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001;
Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2012). Technically, this implies that
the resulting bargaining game has infinitely many players, and
hence it is not covered by Theorem 1. An extension to this case,
however, poses no difficulty, because the underlying existence
theorem (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016b) invoked in the proof
of Theorem 1 actually allows for infinitely many players (that
is, agents or selves), provided only finitely many of them move
at the same stage (round) of the game. Therefore, any kind of
time preference can be accommodated, as long as continuity is
preserved.
Example 6. Let n = 3, r tj = (t + j − 1)mod 3 for j = 1, 2, 3, and
ψ t (bt ) = 1 if and only if bt2 + b
t
3 = 2 for all b
t ∈ {0, 1}2, for all
t = 1, 2, . . . That is, three players take turns in making proposals
and acceptance is by unanimity. Utility functions are given by
ui(a, 1) = ai and ui(a, T ) = βδ
T−1ai for some β, δ ∈ (0, 1)
for T = 2, 3, . . . , for all a ∈ ∆ and all i = 1, 2, 3, i.e., the
next round is discounted by βδ while later rounds t > 1 are
discounted by βδt−1. Theorem 1 (extended as explained above)
applies, and hence the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium
is guaranteed. In this case, the equilibrium can be identified
through standard arguments.
Let v̄ti resp. v
t
i denote the supremum resp. the infimum of
player i’s equilibrium payoffs in any subgame starting in the tth
round, for t = 1, 2, . . . and i = 1, 2, 3. All subgames starting
in the fourth round are identical to the game starting in the
first round. Thus, as i will accept (resp. reject) any offer that
gives her more (resp. less) than v̄ti (resp. v
t
i ), the usual optimality
argument (see Shaked and Sutton, 1984) yields, for t = 3 and
player 3,



















i for players i = 1, 2. Further, for
t = 2,














for player 3, while for player 2
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4 Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2018) characterizes subgame perfect equilibria
in the two-player, alternating offers bargaining game of Rubinstein (1982)
when players have time-inconsistent preferences, and shows that non-stationary
equilibria arise under certain violations of present bias.
and for player 1




























Since all subgames beginning in the fourth round are identical to












1 + βδ + β2δ2
for all i = 1, 2, 3. Due to hyperbolic discounting player 3’s agent
in the first round accepts the offer a13 = β
2δ2/(1 + βδ + β2δ2)
even though she would prefer to wait for the third round and
ask 1/(1 + βδ + β2δ2) for herself, which she now values at
βδ2/(1+βδ+β2δ2) > a13. But she has no control over her agent in
the second round who accepts a22 = βδ/(1+βδ+β
2δ2), which in
the second round is as good to him as asking 1/(1+βδ+β2δ2) in
the third round. Therefore, player 3’s agent in the first round has
to accept an offer that is worth less to her than the discounted
value of her own offer in the third round.
A special case of this example is β = 1, the standard case of
geometric discounting. For that case the example shows that with
a unanimity rule three-player bargaining yields a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium.5
5.3. Other-regarding preferences
The specification of utility functions for the general bargaining
games studied in this paper only requires continuity of payoffs
on the space of bargaining outcomes. There is no requirement
whatsoever that payoffs depend only on the own coordinate of
the allocation. In particular, players may not only care about
their share, as was explicitly assumed e.g. in Rubinstein (1982,
Assumption A1). This leaves room for explicitly incorporating
externalities and other-regarding preferences, as in the models
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
That is, as a consequence of Theorem 1, equilibrium existence is
guaranteed in any bargaining model where some or all players
display other-regarding preferences.
More complex examples are also possible where the prefer-
ences of players not only depend on the shares received by other
players, but also do so through the actual utility that players de-
rive from the shares. This is illustrated in the following example
with three bargaining partners.
Example 7. Let n = 3, r tj = (t+ j−1)mod 3 for all j = 1, 2, 3, and




j ≥ 1 for all b
t ∈ {0, 1}2, for all
t = 1, 2, . . . That is, players take turns in proposing and voting
and the acceptance decision is by simple majority voting (since
the proposal counts as a Yes-vote). Picture the three players in a
triangle, with player 2 to the right of player 1 and player 3 to her
left. The payoff functions display other-regarding preferences as
follows.
ui(a, T ) = δ
T−1ai + αu(i+1)mod 3(a, T ) − α
2u(i+2)mod 3(a, T )
for some α, δ ∈ (0, 1) for all a ∈ ∆, all T = 1, 2, . . . , and
i = 1, 2, 3. That is, what matters to a player is not only her share
of the surplus, but also how her neighbor to the right feels about
the allocation (with weight α), even though she despises a bit the
opinion of her neighbor to the left (with weight −α2). Solving the
equation system for utility functions yields
ui(a, T ) =
δT−1
(
ai + αa(i+1)mod 3
)
1 + α3
5 We do not know whether or not this logic extends to the case n > 3.
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for all a ∈ ∆, all T = 1, 2, . . . , and i = 1, 2, 3, i.e., players
care about their own share and their neighbor’s. Hence, utilities
are continuous and Theorem 1 applies. An equilibrium – one of
many, of course – is easily found: Every proposer i asks 1/(1 +
δ2) for herself, offers 0 to (i + 1)mod 3, and δ2/(1 + δ2) to
(i + 2)mod 3, for all i = 1, 2, 3. Every responder j accepts any
offer with aj ≥ δ
2/(1 + δ2) and rejects otherwise, for j = 1, 2, 3.
It is easy to verify that this is an equilibrium, as the responder
who is offered a positive share has to wait for two rounds before
it is her turn to make the offer. This equilibrium is independent
of the parameter α that measures altruism.
5.4. Multi-issue bargaining
In Section 3 it was assumed that bargaining outcomes a ∈ ∆
live in a simplex. This amounts to assuming that there is only a
single issue that is negotiated. On the other hand, an important
strand of the literature has studied multi-issue bargaining in the
sense that several surpluses may be distributed (Inderst, 2000;
Busch and Horstmann, 2002; In and Serrano, 2003, 2004). The
proof of Theorem 1 makes no use of the dimensionality of ∆,
though. Since it relies exclusively on continuity and compactness,
the simplex ∆ could easily be replaced by a cube ∆K , or any
nonempty compact subset of RK , that captures K > 1 distinct
issues about which players bargain. The arguments establishing
existence of equilibrium remain unchanged.
5.5. Procedural preferences
In the main part of the paper we have taken a non-procedural
stance, according to which bargaining partners care only about
how the surplus is finally split and about when agreement is
reached—but not about how this is brought about. Formally this
is expressed by defining utility functions on the space Z of eco-
nomic outcomes. If the procedure of bargaining in itself – how
outrageous or how modest offers are, how stubbornly people
behave, whether they enjoy or despise lengthy negotiations, etc.
– influences well-being, then preferences need to be defined di-
rectly on plays.6 That is, the appropriate domain for ‘‘procedural’’
preferences is then the set W of plays, rather than the set Z .
This would not pose a problem for the existence proof, though.
For, the underlying theorem (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016b,
Theorem 1; 2016a, Theorem 7.4) holds for preferences defined
on plays, even if those are purely ordinal, i.e., not necessarily
representable by utility functions. Of course, the main hypothesis,
continuity with respect to a (compact separated) topology on
the set of plays, would then have to apply to these preferences
defined on plays, but, with this modified hypothesis, Theorem 1
can be immediately extended to cover procedural preferences.
5.6. A simple non-stationary example without immediate agreement
The following example illustrates a non-stationary, player-
asymmetric environment where there is no immediate agree-
ment.
Example 8. Let n = 3 and set r t = (1, 2, 3) for all t odd, r t =
(2, 1, 3) for all t even. That is, players 1 and 2 make proposals
alternatingly, with the other player voting first. Player 3 never
gets to propose, and always votes second. For t = 1, 2, the voting
rule is unanimity, i.e. ψ t (b) = 1 ⇔ b = (1, 1). Yet, after t = 3
6 For example, Li (2007) studies bilateral bargaining when players prefer an
impasse to accepting offers which would give them lower discounted payoffs
than those of offers they have previously rejected.
player 3 becomes a dummy player. For all t ≥ 3, ψ t (b) = 1 ⇔
b2 = 1, i.e., the rule becomes unanimity among 1 and 2.
Let ui(a, t) = δ
t−1ai for i = 1, 2. Since player 3 is effectively
out of the game for all t ≥ 3, it follows that in all subgames
at or after t = 3 the only subgame perfect equilibrium is as








and accepts if and only if offered a share of at least δ
1+δ
, and
symmetrically for player 2.
Suppose that player 3 has other-regarding, spiteful prefer-
ences of the form
u3(a, t) = δ
t−1a3 + min {t − 1, 2}
(
1 − δt−1(1 − a3)
)
.
That is, player 3 values getting a large share for himself (and
u3(a, t) is increasing in a3 for any fixed t), but also values reducing
the discounted joint payoffs of the other two players as much as
possible, and the utility weight of this reduction increases every
period until t = 3 (when the player becomes a dummy). Since
ui is continuous in the sense of Section 3 for all i = 1, 2, 3, with
u1(∞) = u2(∞) = 0, u3(∞) = 2, Theorem 1 applies. In any
subgame perfect equilibrium, at t = 2, players know that if player









at t = 3. Hence, if an offer at t = 2 is to be preferred by both
players 1 and 2 to waiting until t = 3, it must give player 1
at least δ
1+δ
and player 2 at least δ
2
1+δ
. Hence, no offer at t = 2






= 1− δ. For, given such an allocation, either player
2 prefers to wait (and hence will not make the offer if it is to be
accepted) or player 1 prefers to wait (and hence will vote against).
However, a direct computation shows that if an offer at t = 2
gave player 3 1− δ, that player would vote against it, because he
prefers to receive 0 one period later than 1 − δ at t = 2. Indeed,




⇔ δ(1 − δ) < 1 − δ2b ⇔ δ < 1 + δ
and the last inequality holds immediately. It follows that player 3
would also reject any offer at t = 2 giving him strictly less than
1 − δ. We conclude that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the
equilibrium offer of player 2 at t = 2 must be rejected.
Analogously, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, at t = 1








will be realized at t = 3. Hence, if an offer at t = 1
is to be preferred by both players 1 and 2 to waiting until t = 3, it
must give player 1 at least δ
2
1+δ




offer at t = 1 can be made and accepted if it gives player 3 strictly






= 1 − δ2. Again, a direct computation
shows that player 3 will vote against any offer at t = 1 giving
him 1− δ2, since u3(1− δ





and the last inequality is obviously true. That is, in all subgame
perfect equilibria of this game players 1 and 2 purposefully make
offers which will be rejected in the first two periods, and reach
an agreement in period 3.
This example is stylized, but it can of course be generalized.
The key of the example is the willingness of one player to wait
in order to reduce other players’ payoffs, a phenomenon allowed
by other-regarding preferences, and the feasibility of shutting
down this player by waiting until an appropriate environmental
change, which is allowed by the non-stationarity of the setting.
It also illustrates that the setting allows for the effective set of
bargaining agents to be time-dependent.
5.7. A non-stationary environment without stationary equilibria
Stationary equilibrium assumes that players are unresponsive
to the past. To bypass a lengthy discussion of what that precisely
9
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means, consider the archetypal bilateral bargaining model with
alternating proposers. Player 1 begins by making an offer to
which player 2 responds by either accepting or rejecting. In the
former case the proposal is implemented and the game ends; in
the latter case the clock turns to the next period and player 2 gets
to make an offer. Player 2’s proposal may be accepted by player
1, ending the game, or rejected, which puts player 1 back into the
proposer role next period.
At least in this simple model any stationary equilibrium must
entail a pair of functions bi : [0, 1] → {0, 1}, that specify how
players i = 1, 2 respond to offers a ∈ [0, 1], such that these func-
tions are independent of history and time. To exhibit an example
where no stationary equilibrium exists, we construct a bilat-
eral bargaining model where such a pair of history-independent
response rules cannot exist in equilibrium.
Let qt = 1 − 2
−t for all t = 1, 2, . . ., so {qt}
∞
t=1 is a strictly
increasing sequence with qt ∈ (0, 1) for all t and qt → 1 as
t → ∞. Denote by a ∈ [0, 1] the share of player 1 and define,
for each t = 1, 2, . . ., and i = 1, 2,














−1/t if a ≤ qt
[3 + 2t+2(a − 1)]/t if qt < a < qt+1
1/t if qt+1 ≤ a ≤ qt+2
[−3 + 2t+4(1 − a)]/t if qt+2 < a < qt+3
−1/t if a ≥ qt+3
Note that both players have the same identical interests, and the
stakes vanish as time passes: at period t , −1/t ≤ ui(a, t) ≤ 1/t
for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Define also ui(∞) = 0. It is immediate that these
functions are continuous (including continuity at infinity), and
hence this example fulfills the assumptions of Theorem 1 (and
it is easy to find non-stationary subgame perfect equilibria).
Suppose there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium with sta-
tionary response rules b1, b2. Consider any a ∈ [0, 1). Since qt →
1, there exists t even such that a < qt . In the subgame where
player 2 proposes a at time t , player 1 must reject it, because
acceptance yields payoff −1/t , but rejection leads to a payoff of at
least −1/(t+1). Hence b1(a) = 0. Since t+1 is odd and a < qt+1,
it follows analogously that also b2(a) = 0. Further, a = 1 yields
payoff −1 for player 1 at t = 1 and payoff −1/2 for player 2 at
t = 2, while rejection leads to payoffs of at least −1/2 and −1/3,
respectively. Hence b1(1) = b2(1) = 0 also holds.
We conclude that the response rules must specify universal
rejection, and hence the equilibrium outcome is eternal disagree-
ment with payoff ui(∞) = 0. But this cannot be a subgame
perfect equilibrium, because in any subgame starting at period
t with an offer a ∈ (qt+1, qt+2), the responder obtains a strictly
positive payoff by accepting. Thus, this game has no stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium.
6. Conclusions
This paper has studied a general class of multi-lateral bargain-
ing models. No particular model of impatience is required, hence
allowing for geometric or hyperbolic discounting, externalities
and other-regarding preferences are allowed, and bargaining pro-
tocols can be arbitrary and vary over time—hence, no stationary
structure is assumed. The main insight is that all games in that
class have a subgame perfect equilibrium, provided the utility
functions are continuous. Continuity here includes the possibility
of perpetual disagreement, that is, it also holds ‘‘at infinity’’. This
result hence eliminates the necessity to demonstrate existence of
equilibrium for each bargaining problem separately, by providing
a general existence proof for a wide class of problems.
Appendix A. Topologies
A.1. The space of economic outcomes
A bargaining outcome is an allocation and the time at which
it is accepted, (a, t) ∈ ∆× {1, 2, . . .}, or perpetual disagreement,
which is represented by the symbol ∞. Hence, the space of
outcomes is
Z = (∆× {1, 2, . . .}) ∪ {∞}.
To endow it with a natural topology, we will view it as a quotient
set of the larger, instrumental space
Z̄ = ∆× {1, 2, . . . ,∞}.
This latter space has a product structure and is naturally well-
behaved if the appropriate topologies are taken for the factors.
Endow the space of allocations ∆ with the Euclidean topology,
which makes ∆ compact and Hausdorff. The space {1, 2, . . . ,∞}
is also compact and Hausdorff if it is endowed with the one-
point compactification of the discrete topology (also known as
the Fort topology with distinguished point ∞; see, e.g., Steen
and Seebach, 1978, p. 52), that is, a subset of {1, 2, . . . ,∞} is
open if and only if its complement is either finite or contains ∞.
This topology is just the discrete topology (all sets are open) if
restricted to {1, 2, . . .}, but it requires open sets containing ∞
to contain some terminal segment {t, t + 1, . . . ,∞}. It will be
shown below that this topology is closely related to notions of
‘‘continuity at infinity’’.
The space Z̄ is endowed with the product topology and is
therefore compact and Hausdorff. Consider the projection π :
Z̄ → Z given by π (a, t) = (a, t) if t ̸= ∞ and π (a,∞) = ∞
for all a ∈ ∆. This amounts to identifying all outcomes that are
sufficiently far in the future to a single equivalence class. Thereby
the space Z can be seen as the quotient space Z̄/(∆× {∞}) and
endowed with the quotient topology (Steen and Seebach, 1978,
p. 9), that is, a set V ⊆ Z is open in Z if and only if π−1(V ) is
open in the product topology on Z̄ .
Lemma A.1. The set Z endowed with the quotient topology is
compact and Hausdorff.
Proof. Since Z̄ is compact, the quotient set Z is also compact.
To see that it is also Hausdorff, let x, y ∈ Z̄ with x ̸= ∞ ̸= y.
Since Z̄ is Hausdorff, there exist Ux,Uy open sets in Z̄ such that
x ∈ Ux, y ∈ Uy, and Ux ∩ Uy = ∅. Since {1, 2, . . .} is open in
{1, 2, . . . ,∞} and x ̸= ∞ ̸= y, the sets U ′x = Ux ∩∆× {1, 2, . . .}
and U ′y = Uy ∩ ∆ × {1, 2, . . .} are also open sets in Z̄ such that






y = ∅. Consider the (singleton) classes
[x] and [y] in Z . Then π−1(U ′x) and π
−1(U ′y) are open sets of Z with
[x] ∈ π−1(U ′x), [y] ∈ π
−1(U ′y), and π
−1(U ′x) ∩ π
−1(U ′y) = ∅.
Hence all classes [x], [y] different from [∞] can be separated
by open sets. To complete the proof, let x = (a, t) ∈ Z̄ . We have to
show that the classes [x] and [∞] can be separated by open sets
in the quotient space. To see this, let Ux = ∆ × {1, . . . , t} and
U∞ = ∆ × {t + 1, . . . ,∞}. These sets are disjoint and open in
Z̄ , and fulfill x ∈ Ux and ∞ ∈ U∞. Then π
−1(Ux) and π
−1(U∞)
are open sets of Z with [x] ∈ π−1(Ux), [∞] ∈ π
−1(U∞), and
π−1(Ux) ∩ π
−1(U∞) = ∅. □
Abusing notation, denote the class [x] = {x} in Z simply by
x for each x ̸= ∞, and the class [∞] = ∆ × {∞} by ∞. For
convenience, if V ⊆ Z , the set V \{∞} can be viewed as a subset of
Z̄ and hence cumbersome notation can be avoided. In particular,
if ∞ /∈ V the set V can be seen both as a subset of Z and as a
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subset of Z̄ . If ∞ ∈ V ⊆ Z , the set π−1(V ) ⊆ Z̄ corresponds to V
with the addition of all pairs of the form (a,∞). Formally,
π−1(V ) =
{
V if ∞ /∈ V
(V \ {∞}) ∪ (∆× {∞}) if ∞ ∈ V .
That is, if an open set V ⊆ Z contains ∞, the open set
π−1(V ) ⊆ Z̄ contains the whole ‘‘limit slice’’ ∆ × {∞}. The
following lemma identifies an important property of such sets,
which will be used in the proofs below.
Lemma A.2. Let U ⊆ Z̄ be an open set in the product topology on
Z̄ such that ∆ × {∞} ⊆ U. Then, there exists T ≥ 1 such that
∆× {T , T + 1, . . . ,∞} ⊆ U.
Proof. For each a ∈ ∆, (a,∞) ∈ U . Since U is open, there
exist U1(a) open in ∆ and U2(a) open in {1, 2, . . . ,∞} such that
(a,∞) ∈ U1(a) × U2(a) ⊆ U .
The sets {U1(a) | a ∈ ∆ } form an open cover of ∆. Since
∆ with the Euclidean topology is compact, there exists a finite
subcover, i.e. a1, . . . , am ∈ ∆ such that U1(a1) ∪ U1(a2) ∪ · · · ∪
U1(am) = ∆. For each j = 1, . . . ,m, the set U2(aj) is open in
{1, 2, . . . ,∞} but contains ∞. Open sets in the topology of this
space are those whose complements are either finite or contain
∞. Since the former cannot happen, it follows that for each j =
1, 2, . . . ,m, there exists tj such that {tj, tj + 1, . . . ,∞} ⊆ U2(aj).
Let T = maxj=1,...,m tj. Then, U1(aj) × {T , T + 1, . . . ,∞} ⊆ U for
all j and, since the sets U1(aj) cover ∆, it follows that ∆×{T , T +
1, . . . ,∞} ⊆ U . □
A.2. The space of plays





















∈ W T , T < ∞
∞ if w ∈ W∞
(1)
Viewed as an infinite union the space W does not lend itself
to a natural well-behaved topology. Therefore, we will embed
it into an instrumental space of sequences from an enlarged
space of instantaneous actions. The latter can be endowed with a
natural well-behaved product topology, but does contain many
situations which cannot be interpreted in terms of the game.
Thus, the actual space of plays will be a proper subset of the
set of sequences. This subset will be shown to be closed in the
product topology. In this way, the relative topology (inherited by
the closed subset) will provide a well-behaved topology for the
space of plays.
Expand the set of allocations ∆ with a dummy action ∗, indi-
cating that agreement was achieved in the past. Likewise, expand
the set of voting profiles B with a dummy profile ∗∗, indicating
that no voting is called for, as the game has ended. Take the set
of instantaneous action profiles as
Ω = (∆ ∪ {∗})× (B ∪ {∗∗}) .
Endow ∆ with the Euclidean topology and ∆ ∪ {∗} with a
Euclidean-expanded topology where V ⊆ ∆ ∪ {∗} is open if and
only if V ∩∆ is open in ∆. That is, the topology on ∆∪{∗} simply
‘‘ignores’’ the additional point, and the singleton {∗} is declared
open. This topology makes ∆ ∪ {∗} compact and Hausdorff. The
finite set B ∪ {∗∗} is endowed with the discrete topology, which
of course makes it also compact and Hausdorff. The set Ω =
(∆ ∪ {∗})× (B ∪ {∗∗}) is endowed with the product topology and
hence it is also compact and Hausdorff. Then consider the infinite
product
Ω∞ = [(∆ ∪ {∗})× (B ∪ {∗∗})]∞
endowed with the product topology. This space is compact and
Hausdorff, but it has no natural correspondence with the space of
plays. For instance, sequences where a ∈ ∆ appears strictly after
an occurrence of ∗ cannot be a play. The following identifies the
sequences in Ω∞ that correspond to plays.





∈ Ω∞ is a bargaining
sequence if
(S.1) ā1 ∈ ∆;









= 0∀s = 1, . . . , t − 1 for all
t = 1, 2, . . .
Condition (S.1) states that bargaining begins with an offer.
(S.2) demands that dummy options always occur in both coor-
dinates of the instantaneous action profile. (S.3) stipulates that
after rejections bargaining continues and after an acceptance it
ends. Let W̄ ⊂ Ω∞ denote all bargaining sequences.
Lemma A.3. The set W̄ is closed in Ω∞.
Proof. It will be proved that the complement Ω∞ \ W̄ of W̄ is
open (in the product topology onΩ∞) by showing that it contains
an open neighborhood for all its points. More precisely, for any
sequence w̄ ∈ Ω∞ \W̄ and every possible violation of (S.1–3) we
will exhibit a basic open set U that contains w̄ and is contained





∈ Ω∞ \ W̄ . Then w̄ violates at
least one of the conditions from Definition A.1.
If w̄ fails (S.1), i.e. ā1 = ∗, take U = ({∗} × (B ∪ {∗∗}))×Ω∞.
If w̄ violates (S.2), then there is t ≥ 2 such that either āt = ∗
and b̄t ∈ B or āt ∈ ∆ and b̄t = ∗∗. In the first case let
U = Ω t−1 × ({∗} × B)×Ω∞, in the second case let U = Ω t−1 ×
(∆× {∗∗})×Ω∞.
If w̄ fails the ‘‘if’’-part of (S.3) with āt ∈ ∆ or its ‘‘only if’’-part,
then there is t such that either ψ s(b̄s) = 0 for all s = 1, . . . , t − 1




∈ ∆ × B but ψ s(b̄s) = 1 for some s =




(∆ ∪ {∗})× {b̄s}
))
×





(∆ ∪ {∗})× {b̄s}
))
× ({∗} × (B ∪ {∗∗}))×Ω∞.
Since it is not difficult to check that all the sets U are basic open
neighborhoods of w̄ contained inΩ\W̄ , the proof is complete. □
Since W̄ is closed in Ω∞ and the latter space is compact and
Hausdorff with the product topology, the set W̄ together with the
relative topology inherited from Ω∞ (as a subspace) is compact
and Hausdorff. All that remains is to show that there is a natural









a1, b1, . . . , aT , bT ,





∈ W T , T < ∞
w if w ∈ W∞.
This mapping is obviously injective (one to one). To show that
is surjective (onto), let w̄ ∈ W̄ . If w̄ ∈ (∆× B)∞, then w̄ ∈ W∞
7 A basis for the product topology consists of the product sets for which all
but finitely many of the factors are unrestricted. An open set from this basis is
a basic open set.
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/∈ (∆× B)∞, by (S.3) there




⏐ āt = ∗
}
. By
(S.3) again, b̄s ̸= ∗∗, for all s < t̄ . By (S.2) and (S.3), ψ s(b̄s) = 0





∈ W t̄−1. Further, by (S.2) ās = ∗ and b̄s = ∗∗ for all








Hence, Λ is a bijection between W and W̄ . Formally, the
topology on W̄ defines a compact Hausdorff topology on W by
declaring U ⊆ W to be open if and only if Λ(U) is open in W̄ . In
practice, we can simply identify the spaces W and W̄ and rely on
the topology on W̄ . To economize on notation, in the sequel we
will follow this approach and identify W and W̄ , meaning that
a play w ∈ W can also be seen as the corresponding bargaining
sequence in the sense of Definition A.1.
A.3. The outcome mapping
Having endowed the set W of plays and the set Z of outcomes
with compact Hausdorff topologies, the next step is to show that
the mapping ϕ from (1), as a mapping between these topological
spaces, is continuous.
Lemma A.4. The outcome mapping ϕ : W → Z is continuous.
Proof. Let V ⊆ Z be an open set. By construction of the topology
on Z , as a quotient topology derived from Z̄ = ∆×{1, 2, . . . ,∞},
the subset π−1(V ) of Z̄ is open in the product topology on Z̄ . To
prove that ϕ−1(V ) is open in W , it will be shown that ϕ−1(V )
contains an open neighborhood for each of its elements. Let w ∈
ϕ−1(V ) and let v = ϕ(w) ∈ V . Two cases need to be distinguished.
First, suppose that v ̸= ∞. In this case π−1(v) = {v}. Then,










, it also follows that ãT = aT and
ψT (b̃T ) = 1. Since V is open in Z̄ and v ∈ π−1(V ), there are U1





U1 × U2 ⊆ π
−1(V ). Then the set






is an open basic set of the product topology onΩ∞. Hence, U∩W̄
is an open set of W̄ and, through the identification of this set with
the space of plays, of W . For every w′ ∈ U ∩W̄ , since ψT (b̃T ) = 1,
it follows that π−1(ϕ(w′)) = {ϕ(w′)} ⊆ U1 × {T } ⊆ U1 × U2 ⊆
π−1(V ). Therefore, w ∈ U ∩ W̄ ⊆ ϕ−1(V ).
Suppose now that v = ∞, that is, w is a perpetual disagree-
ment path. In this case, π−1(v) = ∆ × {∞} ⊆ π−1(V ). By
Lemma A.2, there is T ≥ 1 such that ∆ × {T , T + 1, . . . ,∞} ⊆
π−1(V ). Then the set U = (∆× B)T × (Ω)∞ is an open basic set
of the product topology on Ω∞, U ∩W̄ is an open set of W̄ , and –
by the identification of this set with the space of plays – of W . For
every w′ ∈ U ∩ W̄ , either agreement occurs at a finite time larger
than or equal to T , in which case π−1(ϕ(w′)) = {ϕ(w′)}, or there is
perpetual disagreement, ϕ(w′) = ∞. In both cases, π−1(ϕ(w′)) ⊆
∆×{T , T+1, . . . ,∞} ⊆ π−1(V ). Hence w ∈ U∩W̄ ⊆ ϕ−1(V ). □
Appendix B. The bargaining tree
Following the original approach of von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944), a node in an extensive form game is simply
a collection of outcomes, those that are still available when a
player decides at that node. A node precedes another node if and
only if the latter is properly contained in the former. Intuitively,
decisions discard possible outcomes and hence reduce the size
of the nodes.8 For the perfect information case treated here, the
game is fully characterized by the collection of nodes (the ‘‘tree’’)
and the specification of which player is active when.
The nodes in the tree of the bargaining game are as follows. At
each round s = 1, 2, . . . there are n ‘‘slices’’, (s, 1) to (s, n), where
the proposer and the second-to-last responder act, respectively.
At slice (s, 1), the player selected as proposer in that round (which
may vary depending on previous votes) makes an offer. The nodes


















⏐ at = āt , bt = b̄t ∀t ≤ s − 1
}
where i = r s1(b̄






describing a previous history of rejected offers,




= 0 for all t = 1, . . . , s − 1. (The
subindex in the union describing the node xsi runs from s to ∞;
in particular, T = ∞ is allowed to capture plays with perpetual



























= 0 ∀t ≤ s − 1
i = r s1(b̄





In particular, at slice (1, 1) the set X11 consists of only one node,
containing all plays, which is, as a set, identical with W—the root
of the game.































at = āt ∀t ≤ s,
bt = b̄t ∀t ≤ s − 1,
bsℓ = b̄
s




following a sequence of rejected offers, where j = r sk(b̄
1, . . . , b̄s−1)
is the (k − 1)th responder, who plays at this node and whose
identity depends on previous votes. That is, the set of nodes at
slice (s, k) with k ≥ 2 is as given in Box I below.
Finally, the set of terminal nodes after acceptance of offers
at round s, which formally belong to slice (s + 1, 1), is given
by the singletons of the corresponding finite plays, Es+1 =
{{w} | w ∈ W s } for each s = 1, 2, . . .
Following the notation in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016a;
2016b), the slice (s, k), viewed as a collection of nodes, is denoted
by Ys,k. Thus, Y1,1 = {W } and Ys,1 = X
s
1 ∪ E
s for each s ≥ 1.
Since terminal nodes only occur after all votes have been cast,
also Ys,k = X
s
k for each k ≥ 2.
B.1. Properties of the bargaining tree
Here we show that the tree as defined fulfills the hypothe-
ses for the result of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b, Theo-
rem 1; 2016a, Theorem 7.4).
B.2. Well-behaved
The first condition stipulates that the game is ‘‘well-behaved’’.
This condition has two parts. The first is that the preferences of all
players are continuous with respect to the topology on the space
8 This approach has been developed for arbitrarily large extensive form
games (see Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016a), showing e.g. the relation with
popular ‘‘graphical approaches’’ where trees are viewed as graphs.
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āt ∈ ∆ ∀t ≤ s,
b̄t ∈ B ∀t ≤ s − 1,





= 0 ∀t = 1, . . . , s − 1
j = r sk(b̄












of plays. Since here payoffs are defined on bargaining outcomes,
ui : Z → R, plays need to be mapped into outcomes by the
function ϕ : W → Z . As ϕ is continuous by Lemma A.4, the
composition ui ◦ ϕ is continuous if ui : Z → R is continuous. The
latter amounts to continuity with respect to the topology on Z
derived as the quotient topology of Z̄ with respect to∆×{∞}. The
following shows that our continuity assumptions on ui are exactly
equivalent to continuity with respect to this topology. Note that
(ii) below amounts to ‘‘continuity at infinity’’.
Proposition B.1. The function ui : Z → R is continuous with respect
to the topology on Z derived as the quotient topology of Z̄ with
respect to ∆ × {∞} if and only if it is continuous in the sense of
Definition 1, that is,
(i) for each t = 1, 2, . . . , the function uti : ∆ → R given by
uti (a) = ui(a, t) for each a ∈ ∆ is continuous (with respect to
the Euclidean topologies on ∆ and R), and
(ii) for each ε > 0 there exists T ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that
|ui(a, t) − ui(∞)| < ε for all a ∈ ∆ and all t ≥ T .
Proof. ‘‘if:’’ Suppose that (i) and (ii) hold. To see that ui is con-
tinuous, let V ⊆ R be an open set of real numbers. To prove that
u−1i (V ) is open in Z , we will show that u
−1
i (V ) contains an open
neighborhood for each for its elements. To see this, let z ∈ u−1i (V )
and distinguish two cases.
First, if z ̸= ∞, then z = (a, t) for some a ∈ ∆ and












(V ) × {t} ⊆
u−1i (V ). Second, suppose z = ∞. Since V is open and ui(∞) ∈
V , there is ε > 0 such that (ui(∞) − ε, ui(∞) + ε) ⊆ V . By
(ii), there exists T ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that for each a ∈ ∆
and each t ≥ T , |ui(a, t) − ui(∞)| < ε. It follows that {∞} ∪
(∆× {1, 2, . . .}) ⊆ u−1i ((ui(∞) − ε, ui(∞) + ε)) ⊆ u
−1
i (V ). As
{∞} ∪ (∆× {1, 2, . . .}) = π (∆ × {1, 2, . . . ,∞}), this set is an
open neighborhood of ∞ in Z .
‘‘only if:’’ Let ui : Z → R be continuous. To see (i), fix





(V ) = {a ∈ ∆ | ui(a, t) ∈ V } = u
−1
i (V ) ∩ (∆× {t}) .
The set u−1i (V ) is open in Z because ui is continuous, and the
set ∆ × {t} is open by construction of the topology on Z , since




(V ) is open in Z . Since V
was arbitrary, uti is continuous.
To see (ii), let ε > 0. As ∞ ∈ Z , ui(∞) ∈ R and the
interval (ui(∞) − ε, ui(∞) + ε) is open in R. By continuity u
−1
i
((ui(∞) − ε, ui(∞) + ε)) is open in Z and contains ∞.
By Lemma A.2, there is T ≥ 1 such that
∆× {T , T + 1, . . . ,∞} ⊆ π−1
(
u−1i ((ui(∞) − ε, ui(∞) + ε))
)
.
Thus, for all t ≥ T and all a ∈ ∆, (a, t) = π−1(a, t) fulfills
ui(a, t) ∈ (ui(∞) − ε, ui(∞) + ε), establishing (ii). □
The second part of well-behavedness demands that the non-
terminal nodes at each slice Ys,k are partitioned into finitely many
cells,9 each of which consists of decision points of a single player,
such that the set of plays passing through each cell is closed
relative to the plays passing through the slice (the set W (Ys,k) of
plays).
Begin with slice Ys,1 for s ≥ 1. For s = 1 the condition
is trivially true, because at the root a single player moves. For
s > 1 and a given player i ∈ I who proposes at slice (s, 1),









(where T may be ∞),





× Ω∞ is a basic open set in Ω∞, hence
open in W̄ and, by the identification of plays with bargaining
sequences, open in W . And U contains w̄. Further, no play in U
can pass through a decision point of i at Ys,1, because if it would,
last round’s voting profile b̄s−1 would have given her the move









contains w̄, and is contained in the complement of i’s decision




was arbitrary, i’s cell at Ys,1 is
closed.
Next, for s ≥ 1 and k > 1 at slice Ys,k and a given player i, who





∈ W (Ys,k) (where T
may be ∞), which does not pass through any decision point of






× Ω∞ is a basic open set
in Ω∞, hence open in W̄ and, by the identification of plays and
bargaining sequences, open in W . As w̄ ∈ U but i does not move
at Ys,k along any member of U , the relatively open set U ∩W (Ys,k)
is contained in the complement of i’s decision points at Ys,k and
forms a relative neighborhood of w̄. Therefore, i’s cell at Ys,k is
closed.
Putting the above together completes the verification that the
first necessary condition holds, i.e., the bargaining game is indeed
well-behaved.
B.3. Closed nodes
The second condition is that all nodes, viewed as sets of plays,
are closed sets in the topology on the set of plays W .
Proposition B.2. All nodes of the bargaining tree are closed sets in
the topology on plays.
Proof. Since the space of plays is Hausdorff, all singleton sets
(terminal nodes) are closed. Consider the nodes of a proposer i
in a slice s, that is, the nodes in the set X s1 where player i makes







be one such node. To see





∈ W \ x (viewed as a
bargaining sequence). There exists some t̂ ∈ {1, . . . , s − 1} such
that either at̂ ̸= āt̂ or bt̂ ̸= b̄t̂ . Suppose the first holds (the second
case is analogous). If at̂ ̸= ∗, since ∆ is Hausdorff, there exists an
open set V of∆ such that at̂ ∈ V but āt̂ /∈ V . If at̂ = ∗, let V = {∗}.
9 The sets that together form a partition are referred to as cells.
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The set U = (Ω)t̂−1×(V × B)×(Ω)∞ is an open basic set ofΩ∞,
hence U∩W̄ is open in W̄ (andW ). Obviously,w ∈ U∩W̄ ⊆ W \x.
The proof for responders’ nodes at a given slice is analogous. □
B.4. Open predecessors
The last condition, called the ‘‘open predecessors condition’’,
requires that the predecessor mapping is open. For a node x
denote by p(x) its immediate predecessor. Then the condition
demands that for every slice Ys,k and every set of nodes V ⊆ Ys,k,
if the set of playsW (V ) is open in the relative topology onW (Ys,k),
then the set of plays passing through the predecessors of nodes in
V , W (p(V )), is open in the relative topology of the previous slice,
i.e., on the set W (Ys,k−1) if k ≥ 2 or on the set W (Ys−1,N ) if k = 1.
Proposition B.3. The tree fulfills the open predecessors condition.
Proof. Let V ⊆ Ys,k be such that the set of plays W (V ) is open
in the relative topology on W (Ys,k). There are three cases to be
distinguished.
Case 1: From Ys,k to Ys,k−1 (k ≥ 3).






play (viewed as a bargaining sequence) with w ∈ W (p(V )) ⊆













, where i is the player active at p(x).












for some j ∈ I .












. SinceW (V ) is open, it follows that there













⏐ b̄sℓ = b
s





and the latter set is contained in W (V ). Note that both w and w̄


























⏐ b̄sℓ = b
s




Then U∩W̄ is open in W̄ , hence inW , withw ∈ U∩W̄ ⊆ W (p(V )),
demonstrating that the latter set is open.
Case 2: From Ys,2 to Ys,1 (k = 2).






with w ∈ W (p(V )) ⊆ W (Ys,1). There exists a node x ∈ V such







, where i is the proposer active








, where j is the first
responder after the node x.









. Since W (V ) is open, there are open sets




U t × C t
)
×
(U s × B)× (Ω)∞
]

















. It follows that U ∩ W̄ is open in
W̄ , hence in W , with w ∈ U ∩ W̄ ⊆ W (p(V )), so the latter set is
open.
Case 3: From Ys,1 to Ys−1,N (k = 1).
In this case, W (Ys,1) = W (Ys−1,N ) ∪ E
s−1. Let w ∈ W (p(V )).
There exists x ∈ V such that w ∈ p(x). If x is a terminal node,
then there exists a play w̄ such that x = {w̄} with w̄ ∈ W s−1. If
x is not terminal, choose any w̄ ∈ x. Note that w and w̄ coincide
up to bargaining round s − 1.
Since W (V ) is open, there are open sets of Ω , U t × C t , t =








∩ W̄ ⊆ W (V ).








. It follows that U ∩ W̄ is open in W̄ , hence in W , with
w ∈ U ∩ W̄ ⊆ W (p(V )), demonstrating that the latter set is
open. □
This completes the verification of the hypotheses of the ex-
istence theorem in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016b, Theo-
rem 1; 2016a, Theorem 7.4).
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